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MICHIGAN V. EPA: INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION AND EPA’S 
“NOX SIP CALL” 
PATRICIA ROSS McCUBBIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, faced with mounting evidence that states along the eastern 
seaboard could not comply with national air quality standards for ozone 
pollution due, in part, to emissions originating in upwind states,1 the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a highly controversial rule, the 
“NOx SIP Call,” requiring twenty-three states to reduce their emissions.2  For 
the first time, EPA had initiated an attempt under the federal Clean Air Act3 to 
 
* J.D., B.A., University of Virginia.  Professor McCubbin is an assistant professor at the Southern 
Illinois University School of Law in Carbondale, Illinois, where she teaches several 
environmental law courses.  Prior to joining the faculty at Southern Illinois University, she was 
an attorney with the Environmental Defense Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, where she 
served as co-counsel for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in Michigan v. EPA, 213 
F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-632).  She 
wishes to thank Matthew Goetten for his helpful research for this article. 
 1. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 
Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,322 (Nov. 7, 1997) (proposed “NOx SIP Call”) (“States generally were not 
able to meet [the deadlines for complying with national air quality standards for ozone 
because] . . . States were not able to address or control transport [of ozone pollution].”).  See also 
Jason S. Grumet, Old West Justice: Federalism and Clean Air Regulation 1970-1998, 11 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 375, 398-99 (1998) (while scientists have known about the long-range transport of 
ozone since at least the 1970’s, information was not made available and understandable to the 
state regulatory community until the 1997 Ozone Transport Assessment Group study). 
 2. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 
Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (final NOx SIP Call).  For an explanation of the terms “NOx” 
and “SIP Call,” see infra text accompanying notes 8 & 17.  Technically, the NOx SIP Call 
regulates twenty-two states and the District of Columbia but for simplicity this article refers to the 
regulated entities as “twenty-three states.”  Those twenty-three states are found in the midwest, 
southeast and northeast and are: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  63 Fed. Reg. at 57,358. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1999). 
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reduce “interstate ozone pollution,” that is, ozone carried by the prevailing 
winds from one state to another. 
Unprecedented in nature and affecting nearly half the nation, the NOx SIP 
Call was challenged by eight of the twenty-three upwind states along with 
dozens of industries.4 They argued two key issues in the case: first, that EPA 
had improperly identified which upwind states’ emissions were responsible for 
interstate ozone pollution; and, second, that EPA had violated states’ rights 
under the cooperative federalism mandated by the Clean Air Act.5 On March 3, 
2000, however, in Michigan v. EPA, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the rule in all major 
respects.6 To explain the importance of this complex case, which will give 
EPA greater authority to regulate interstate air pollution in the future, 
presented below are an overview of the NOx SIP Call and analyses of the two 
key issues in the Michigan decision.7 
 
 4. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 
3297 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-632).  The state petitioners were: Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, 
West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Alabama.  The state of Wisconsin 
intervened as a petitioner.  Id. at 668.  Some of the petitioning industries were Appalachian Power 
Company, the United Mine Workers of America, and the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners.  
See Joint Common Issues Brief of Industry/Labor Petitioners, Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1497); Brief of Petitioner Council of Industrial Boiler Owners, 
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1497). 
  Several northeastern states intervened on EPA’s behalf, including New York, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, as did several industries from those states, as well as the 
Province of Ontario and the federal government of Canada, and several environmental groups.  
213 F.3d at 668-69. 
 5. Id. at 674-79, 685-88.  See infra text accompanying notes 24-105 (analyzing these two 
issues in more detail). 
 6. 213 F.3d at 669. 
 7. In addition to the two primary issues discussed in this article, the Michigan court agreed 
with EPA on several other issues, including that: (1) EPA did not have to convene a transport 
commission under sections 176A and 184 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506a & 7511c 
(1994), before issuing the NOx SIP Call (213 F.3d at 671-73); (2) EPA’s modeling was sufficient 
to identify the significant contributions from specific upwind states (id. at 673-74); (3) the rule 
did not conflict with earlier EPA decisions that certain upwind contributions did not violate the 
pre-1990 version of the good neighbor provision (Clean Air Act, § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988)) (213 F.3d at 674); (4) EPA reasonably imposed uniform control 
requirements on all the states subject to the rule, rather than varying the controls based on 
geographic considerations (id. at 679-80); (5) the state of South Carolina was appropriately 
included in the rule (id. at 685); (6) EPA did not violate the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 601-612 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), by certifying that the rule would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (213 F.3d at 688-89); and (7) EPA 
reasonably defined the main sources that could participate in the rule’s NOx emissions trading 
program (id. at 689-90). 
  The court held against EPA when it found that the states of Wisconsin, Missouri and 
Georgia were included in the NOx SIP Call on improper grounds.  Id. at 681-85. 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF THE NOX SIP CALL 
Ground-level ozone pollution, commonly referred to as “smog,” forms 
when nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) interact 
with sunlight in the earth’s atmosphere.8  NOx and VOCs are emitted by 
thousands of diverse sources across the country.  Coal-burning power plants 
are emissions sources, but so too are such smaller sources as gasoline 
distributors, diesel engines and automobiles.9 
Because the transformation of NOx and VOCs into ozone occurs in the 
atmosphere where prevailing westerly winds can carry the pollutants over great 
distances,10 several northeastern–and therefore downwind–states repeatedly 
had urged EPA to require upwind states to impose greater controls on NOx and 
VOC emissions.11 Although ozone is one of six air pollutants for which EPA 
has promulgated “national ambient air quality standards,”12 EPA had been 
 
  The court also considered several other issues specific to industrial boilers, rejecting all 
but the claim that EPA failed to give proper notice of its definition of an “electricity generating 
unit.”  Id. at 691-93.  The court also agreed with a petitioner that EPA did not give proper notice 
of the control level it assumed for large stationary internal combustion engines.  Finally, the court 
rejected two narrow claims brought by an electric utility regarding “early reduction credits” and 
“low mass emission units.”  Id. at 693-95. 
 8. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359. 
 9. Grumet, supra note 1, at 378. 
 10. 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,333.  See also Grumet, supra note 1, at 381 (scientific studies have 
concluded that ozone may be caused by emissions hundreds of miles away). 
 11. Grumet, supra note 1, at 396 and notes 72-73 (describing New York’s 1989 request that 
EPA take action against ozone transport); id. at 387-88 (describing petitions to EPA by eight 
northeastern states asking for regulation of upwind NOx emissions).  See also Vickie L. Patton, 
The New Air Quality Standards, Regional Haze and Interstate Air Pollution Transport, 28 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10155, 10166 n.89 (1998) (describing repeated efforts by New York, Connecticut 
and other northeastern states to force EPA to impose additional requirements on midwestern 
sources to reduce emissions of another transported pollutant, sulfur dioxide). 
 12. National ambient air quality standards prescribe the maximum acceptable level of the 
pollutant in our ambient air.  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9-.10 (1999) (standards for ozone).  Id. at pt. 50 
(standards for particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and lead).  In 
1979, EPA promulgated the original “primary” standard for ozone, which set the permissible 
level of ozone in the ambient air at 0.12 parts per million (ppm), averaged over one-hour intervals 
(sometimes referred to as the “one-hour standard”).  40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1979).  In 1997, EPA 
promulgated a new, more stringent primary ozone standard as a companion to the older standard.  
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.10).  EPA reduced the maximum allowable level of ozone in the 
ambient air to 0.08 ppm averaged over an eight-hour interval (the “eight-hour standard”).  Id. at 
38,858, 38,861-62. 
  In addition to “primary” standards designed to protect the public health, EPA also sets 
“secondary” standards designed to protect the public welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)(2) (1994).  
In 1997, EPA set the “secondary” ozone standard at the same level as the primary standard.  62 
Fed. Reg. at 38,874-75. 
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reluctant to intercede in the states’ disputes over interstate ozone pollution.13 
However, with broader regulatory power granted by Congress in 1990,14 and 
with scientific evidence indicating that states along the eastern seaboard could 
not comply with the air quality standards for ozone,15 EPA announced a plan, 
in 1997, to determine whether any upwind states should be required, through a 
“SIP Call,” to reduce their emissions.16 
Under the Clean Air Act, in order comply with air quality standards set by 
EPA, each state must develop a State Implementation Plan, or SIP, identifying 
which emissions sources the state will regulate and by what degree.17 EPA 
must review and approve a state’s SIP and, after doing so, may “call” the SIP 
to require its revision if it fails to comply with all the relevant provisions of the 
Clean Air Act.18 To regulate interstate ozone pollution, EPA planned to call the 
SIPs of certain upwind states and require them to reduce their NOx emissions.  
This “NOx SIP Call” would be issued pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D) of the 
Clean Air Act, which requires each state to ensure that emissions from its 
 
 13. See Patton, supra note 11, at 10156 (“Since the adoption of the 1970 Clean Air Act, . . . 
EPA has resisted restrictions on downwind pollution transport or allocating emissions reduction 
responsibilities among states to address transboundary pollution.”); id. at 10166-72 (describing 
EPA’s repeated denials of requests by downwind states for regulation of upwind sources); 
Grumet, supra note 1, at 385 (“By refusing to employ [its] authority [to control interstate air 
pollution], the EPA has until now perpetuated the paradigm of local responsibility set forth in the 
1970 [Clean Air] Act.”). 
 14. In 1990 Congress strengthened the good neighbor provision now found in section 
110(a)(2)(D) and, before 1990, found in section 110(a)(2)(E).  42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988).  
The pre-1990 version only prohibited emissions from “any stationary source within the [upwind] 
State . . . which will . . . prevent attainment or maintenance [of the air quality standards] by any 
other State.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In 1990, Congress revised the provision to focus not only on 
stationary sources, but also “other type[s] of emissions activities” within an upwind state (such as 
automobiles), and to prohibit emissions that “contribute significantly” to downwind 
nonattainment, even if those emissions were not the sole cause of (i.e., “prevented”) 
nonattainment in another state.  Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994).  See Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2360-61 (1996) 
(summarizing changes made in 1990 to the good neighbor provision); Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New 
England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1996) (explaining difficulties in implementing the pre-1990 
version of the good neighbor provision). 
 15. Grumet, supra note 1, at 389 (referring to “improved scientific knowledge among policy 
makers” and “changes in the 1990 [Clean Air Act] Amendments” as contributing to EPA’s 
willingness to issue the NOx SIP Call, as well as “changing politics” and “the growing 
competition between electric utilities”). 
 16. Calls for State Implementation Plan Revisions for Certain States To Reduce Regional 
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 1420 (Jan. 10, 1997). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990). 
 18. See id. § 7410(k)(5).  Prior to 1990, EPA’s authority to require a state to revise its SIP 
was implied from section 110(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H) (1977).  See Virginia v. EPA, 
108 F.3d 1397, 1407 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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pollution sources do not contribute significantly to pollutant levels in another 
state.19 
To issue the NOx SIP Call pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D), EPA faced 
enormous challenges.  EPA had to determine not only which states’ emissions 
were contributing to ozone levels in distant downwind states (and to what 
degree), but also had to define which emissions would be considered 
“significant,” for nowhere does the Clean Air Act define the phrase “contribute 
significantly” or provide any guidance for its interpretation.20 In addition, EPA 
had to develop a regulatory mechanism that would force the states to reduce 
their emissions while, at the same time, leaving each state the flexibility to 
choose which pollution control measures to adopt in order to obtain the 
necessary reductions.21 
To meet these challenges, EPA took two innovative steps.  First, EPA 
developed a definition of “contribute significantly,” based not only on the 
amount of ozone an upwind state contributed to downwind areas, but also on 
what types of pollution sources were found in the state and whether affordable 
pollution controls were available for those sources.22  Second, to prescribe the 
emissions reductions required of the states, EPA assigned to each state an 
“emissions budget,” that is, a cap on the total amount of NOx emissions 
permitted from that state.23  A discussion of these controversial steps, vital to 
understanding the Michigan case, follows. 
III.  AIR QUALITY, CONTROL COSTS AND “CONTRIBUTING SIGNIFICANTLY” 
A. The Good Neighbor Provision Of Section 110(a)(2)(D) 
EPA issued the NOx SIP Call pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Clean 
Air Act,24 the “good neighbor provision,”25 which requires each state to 
include provisions in its SIP prohibiting: 
any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting 
any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to 
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with 
respect to any . . . national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.26 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1990). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-56.  Referring to “states’ emissions” does not 
mean only emissions from state-owned or state-operated sources, and instead means emissions 
from all sources–public and private–in the state. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 80-86. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-56. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 80-86. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994). 
 25. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,366. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1990) (emphasis added).  See supra text of note 12.  
(describing primary and secondary standards).  For an explanation of how the current version of 
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Although this provision clearly prohibits a state from emitting pollutants in 
amounts that will “contribute significantly” to another state’s “nonattainment,” 
that is, its inability to comply with air quality standards set by EPA, the statute 
does not define, quantitatively or otherwise, what is meant by “contribute 
significantly,” nor does it detail the methods to be used to identify which 
upwind emissions from one state might be contributing significantly to another 
state.  EPA began, therefore, to develop its interpretation of section 
110(a)(2)(D) by first turning to sophisticated air quality modeling data then 
available.27 
B. EPA’s Preliminary Determinations Based On Air Quality Modeling Data 
For the NOx SIP Call, EPA relied heavily on air quality modeling data 
provided by the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG).  In 1995, in 
order to study interstate ozone pollution and develop strategies to reduce its 
transport from one state to another, thirty-seven states east of the Rockies 
joined together to create OTAG.28 For two years, using state-of-the-art 
techniques, OTAG studied the complex science of ozone transport and 
concluded that reducing upwind NOx emissions would reduce ozone levels in 
downwind regions, even in downwind regions several hundred miles away.29  
 
the good neighbor provision reflects improvements made by Congress in 1990, see supra text of 
note 14. 
  Section 110(a)(2)(D) not only focuses on upwind state emissions that contribute 
significantly to downwind nonattainment, but also emissions that interfere with a downwind 
state’s ability to maintain its already-established compliance with the air quality standards.  EPA, 
however, did not focus on this aspect of the good neighbor provision, and instead focused on 
emissions that “contribute significantly” to downwind nonattainment.  62 Fed. Reg. at 60,326. 
 27. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,381-83 (describing the major findings from the Ozone Transport 
Assessment Group technical analyses).  See also Michigan, 213 F.3d at 673 (describing EPA’s 
technical analyses). 
 28. Ozone Transport Assessment Group Executive Report (1997) [hereinafter OTAG 
Executive Report] (on file with Public Law Review); 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,319-20.  EPA, industry, 
and environmental representatives also participated in OTAG’s proceedings.  OTAG Executive 
Report, at 3. 
 29. OTAG Executive Report, supra note 28, at 4, 30-32 (describing regional NOx emissions 
reductions as effective in producing reduced ozone levels throughout the OTAG states, though 
recognizing that NOx reductions have the greatest benefit in the immediate area where the 
reductions occur).  See also 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,377 (presenting OTAG’s findings that “[r]egional 
NOx reductions are effective in producing ozone benefits” and “[a]ir quality data documents the 
widespread and pervasive nature of ozone and indicates transport of ozone”) (emphasis added); 
63 Fed. Reg. at 57,396 (describing, for example, Illinois’ contribution to ozone nonattainment in 
New York City). 
  As previously noted, NOx and VOCs combine to form ozone.  See supra text 
accompanying note 8.  OTAG found, however, that reducing emissions of VOCs would only help 
reduce ozone levels in the immediate locales where the VOCs are created, which usually are 
major urban areas, and would not help alleviate ozone in distant downwind states.  OTAG 
Executive Report, supra note 28, at 30; 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,332, 60,377 (summarizing OTAG’s 
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Although its studies provided considerable long-range ozone transport data,30 
OTAG did not determine which upwind states were the most substantial 
contributors to downwind ozone pollution.31 (This was due, in part, to OTAG’s 
use of modeling that examined emissions, not from any individual state, but 
from upwind regional groups of states),32  OTAG also did not determine which 
pollution control measures an upwind region should adopt in order to reduce 
its NOx emissions,33 but instead recommended that the states conduct further 
studies.34 
In addition to relying on OTAG’s studies, EPA also conducted its own 
more detailed modeling that focused on state-by-state, rather than regional, 
analyses.35 This modeling predicted the impact of upwind emissions on 
downwind ozone levels using three measures: (1) the absolute magnitude of 
the ozone contribution from an upwind state to a downwind state; (2) the 
relative magnitude of the upwind state’s contribution compared to the 
downwind state’s ozone level; and (3) the frequency of the contributions.36 
With this air quality modeling data in hand, EPA then turned to the 
difficult task of determining which upwind emissions were contributing 
 
recommendations).  This is so because many VOCs are emitted from natural sources such as trees 
and plants. Thus, even if all man-made VOCs were eliminated, NOx emissions could still interact 
with natural VOCs to form ozone.  See Grumet, supra note 1, at 378. 
 30. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330 (the OTAG process used an innovative approach to develop 
“the most comprehensive analysis of ozone transport ever conducted”); 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,381-
382 (describing OTAG’s technical analyses, including its quantification of contributions).  See 
also OTAG Executive Report, supra note 28, at 1 (“OTAG improved the level of air pollution 
science and information by an order of magnitude. . . .”). 
 31. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,332-33 (OTAG divided the 23-state region into twelve 
“subregions” comprised of portions of multiple states and made conclusions about the 
contributions from one multistate region to another, not any one state to another state). 
 32. Id. 
 33. OTAG recommended to EPA a whole range of emissions controls–ranging from no 
controls beyond current requirements under the Clean Air Act to substantial controls on large 
sources such as power plants.  OTAG Executive Report, supra note 28, at 52-54. 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. 62 Fed. Reg. 60,331-36 (describing OTAG’s modeling, EPA’s method for analyzing the 
results of OTAG’s modeling, and other information EPA used to determine significant 
contributions); 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377, 57,387-89 (describing additional air quality modeling 
EPA conducted after receiving comments). 
 36. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,387.  EPA analyzed an upwind state’s contribution to exceedances of 
the original one-hour ozone standard or the 1997 revised eight-hour ozone standard.  Id. at 
57,387-88.  EPA’s findings based on the eight-hour standard, and the petitioners’ challenges to 
those findings, were stayed after that standard was remanded in American Trucking Assn’s, Inc. 
v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g granted in part and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999), cert. granted and reversed sub nom., Whitman v. American Trucking Assn’s Inc., 121 
S. Ct. 903 (2001).  See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 670-71 (describing stay of EPA’s eight-hour 
findings and challenges thereto). 
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significantly to ozone levels in downwind states.37 EPA’s review of the data 
was informed by its notion of “collective contributions,” that is, a recognition 
that, generally, ozone pollution is caused by the contributions of thousands of 
relatively small, diverse sources over wide areas.38 Although no single source 
might contribute significantly to ozone pollution in a downwind state, many 
sources together certainly could do so.39 Similarly, while a single state’s 
emissions, in absolute terms, might be contributing relatively small amounts of 
ozone downwind, EPA determined that those emissions might nevertheless be 
contributing significantly to another state’s ozone nonattainment when 
combined with the emissions from other states.40  In addition, EPA examined 
not only the amount of ozone contributed but also the frequency of a state’s 
contributions.  An upwind state, according to EPA, might be contributing 
significantly to downwind ozone nonattainment if it contributed infrequent but 
high amounts of ozone or frequent but low amounts of ozone to one or more 
downwind states.41  Based on all of these determinations, and after reviewing 
all the air quality modeling data, EPA concluded preliminarily, pursuant to 
Clean Air Act section 110(a)(2)(D), that emissions from twenty-three upwind 
states, primarily in the midwest and southeast, were contributing significantly 
to ozone nonattainment in one or more downwind states.42 
C. EPA’s Controversial Next Step: Consideration Of Pollution Control Costs 
In an effort to ensure that the NOx SIP Call would be affordable for the 
states to implement, EPA examined the costs of pollution control measures, 
that is, the means available for pollution sources in a state to reduce NOx 
emissions, and defined as “highly cost-effective” any control measure that 
would eliminate one ton of NOx emissions at a cost of no more than $2,000.43 
 
 37. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,390-91. 
 38. Id. at 57,375-77. 
 39. Id. at 57,377 (“[T]he solution to the problem [of ozone transport] is the implementation 
over a wide area of controls on many sources, each of which may have a small or unmeasurable 
ambient impact by itself.”). 
 40. Id. at 57,392.  For example, EPA explained that several relatively small ozone 
contributions from several different states led to a substantial portion of New York City’s ozone 
nonattainment.  See id. at 57,391-92.  In particular, except for the states in the immediate vicinity 
of New York City, no upwind state contributed more than 5% of the total average ozone 
contribution to that city.  Yet together those upwind states contributed a total of 27% to the city’s 
ozone nonattainment on average.  Id. at Table II-3. 
 41. Id. at 57,391. 
 42. Id. at 57,394-98 (summarizing the results of EPA’s assessment of air quality modeling 
data, described as the “first step” in EPA’s efforts to identify the upwind emissions that contribute 
significantly downwind). 
 43. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377-78.  Pollution control measures might include installing 
equipment to burn fuels more efficiently (for example, using “low-NOx burners” or “overfire air”) 
or installing post-combustion technologies to remove NOx from a source’s emissions (for 
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EPA determined that out of the hundreds of pollution sources that a state might 
regulate, highly cost-effective control measures were available for four: (1) 
large boilers and turbines that generate electricity at power plants (“large 
power plants”);44 (2) large boilers and turbines at industrial facilities (“large 
industrial boilers”);45 (3) cement kilns; and (4) stationary internal combustion 
engines (such as pipeline compressors).46 
EPA then took an important–and controversial–next step.  Rather than 
relying on its preliminary determinations based on air quality modeling data 
alone, EPA defined as “contributing significantly” only those upwind NOx 
emissions that could be reduced using the highly cost-effective pollution 
control measures for the four types of sources it had identified.47  More 
specifically, for those four sources, EPA calculated the precise emissions 
levels expected if they were operating with highly cost-effective control 
measures, and only the emissions above those expected levels were deemed to 
be contributing significantly to downwind ozone.48 Sources producing 
emissions at or below those levels were not considered to be contributing 
 
example, using “selective catalytic reduction” or selective noncatalytic reduction”).  See id. at 
57,447. 
  Just as OTAG had found that VOC emissions reductions would not help alleviate long-
range ozone transport, so EPA also did not consider any VOC emissions to be significant 
contributors to downwind states’ ozone nonattainment and did not consider the control costs of 
VOC reductions.  See supra text of note 29; 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,320.  The Michigan court upheld 
EPA’s decision not to give credit under the NOx SIP Call for VOC reductions.  213 F.3d at 688. 
 44. Technically, EPA refers to this category as “large electricity-generating units” (large 
EGUs), which could include traditional, utility-owned power plants or other non-utility-owned 
power generators.  See Supplemental Notice for the Finding of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of 
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,902, 25,923 (May 11, 1998) (explaining 
that the deregulation of the power-generation industry has led numerous non-utility sources to 
generate electricity).  For ease, this article will refer to this category as “large power plants.” 
 45. Industrial boilers are one category of what EPA refers to as “non-EGUs,” 63 Fed. Reg. at 
57,365, and can generate steam for a variety of uses within an industrial complex.  See id. at 
25,923. 
 46. Id. at 57,377-78, 57,399-402.  EPA chose the figure of $2,000 because several recent 
federal and state initiatives to control NOx emissions had cost, on average, a little less than 
$2,000/ton of NOx removed.  See id. at 57,400 & Table 1.  EPA did not find any highly cost-
effective pollution controls for common NOx sources such as automobiles or municipal waste 
combustors.  Id. at 57,402-03. 
 47. Id. at 57,377-78. 
 48. Id. at 57,378.  EPA only reviewed the control availability for emissions in the twenty-
three states that it had identified preliminarily based on air quality data alone.  See id. (“Because 
EPA had also determined that the NOx emissions from the affected upwind States have a large 
and/or frequent impact on downwind nonattainment or maintenance problems, EPA concludes 
that the amount of NOx emissions from those States that can be eliminated through application of 
highly cost-effective control measures contributes significantly to nonattainment or maintenance 
problems downwind.”). 
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significantly to downwind ozone.49  For example, EPA had determined that a 
large power plant, using highly cost-effective control measures, could limit 
emissions to 0.15 pounds of NOx per million British Thermal Units (Btus) of 
heat input (pounds/mmBtu).50  If a plant emitted NOx at a rate greater than 
0.15 pounds/mmBtu, then only the emissions exceeding that level were 
considered to be contributing significantly to downwind ozone.51 Not 
considered to be significant were any NOx emissions originating from a power 
plant emitting NOx at a rate of 0.15 pounds/mmBtu or less, or, for that matter, 
any NOx emissions originating from the many sources for which EPA had not 
specifically identified highly cost-effective control measures.52  NOx emissions 
from automobiles, for example, were not deemed to be contributing 
significantly to downwind ozone at all.53 
EPA’s final definition of “contribute significantly” could easily be seen as 
confusing two separate factors: first, based on scientific data, the actual amount 
of ozone an upwind state was contributing downwind; and second, the types of 
pollution sources in that state and whether highly cost-effective control 
measures were available for them.  Arguably, emissions are no less significant 
if they originate from power plants (for which EPA had identified highly cost-
effective control measures) than emissions originating from automobiles (for 
which EPA had not).  Yet, under the NOx SIP Call, two states contributing the 
same amount of ozone to downwind states, by EPA’s definition, nevertheless 
could be contributing dramatically different “significant” amounts of ozone.  
For example, if Indiana’s NOx emissions primarily were produced by large 
power plants, while Kentucky’s primarily were produced by automobiles, then, 
by EPA’s definition, Indiana’s emissions would be “contributing significantly” 
to a much greater extent than Kentucky’s, even if both states contributed 
equally, as shown by air quality data, to downwind ozone levels.54 
 
 49. Id. (“Because no highly cost-effective controls are available to eliminate the remaining 
amounts of NOx emissions, EPA concludes that those emissions do not contribute significantly to 
downwind nonattainment or maintenance problems.”) 
 50. Id. at 57,401-402.  The heat input value of various fuels differs considerably; thus, 
emissions limits are expressed as a factor of heat inputs.  In determining the cost of NOx 
reductions for large power plants, EPA assumed that the twenty-three covered states would 
participate in an emissions trading program, whereby sources could buy and sell NOx emissions 
reduction credits from state to state.  Id. at 57,400. 
 51. See id. at 57,409-14 (calculating “emissions budgets” for each state assuming the 
“applicable [NOx] emission rate” of 0.15 pounds/mmBtu).  For a discussion of the state emissions 
budgets, see infra text accompanying notes 80-86. 
 52. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,378. 
 53. Id. at 57,402-03. 
 54. This example–far simpler than the more complex facts addressed in the NOx SIP Call–
assumes that Kentucky’s emissions, in addition to originating from automobiles, also come from 
at least a few large power plants, large industrial boilers, cement kilns, and/or stationary internal 
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The petitioners in Michigan brought this apparent inconsistency to the 
D.C. Circuit’s attention, suggesting that the NOx SIP Call did not accomplish 
what should have been its primary goal, namely, reducing high levels of NOx 
emissions that contributed to downwind ozone pollution without regard to the 
types of sources creating those emissions.55  They argued that EPA’s definition 
of “contribute significantly” improperly focused, not on whether sources in a 
state, such as power plants, were actually contributing significant amounts of 
ozone to downwind states, but rather on whether the power plants’ NOx 
emissions levels were as low as levels at power plants that implemented highly 
cost-effective control measures.56  Although the petitioners’ argument had 
some common-sense appeal, the Michigan court paid little heed to this 
practical concern, and instead focused on a more fundamental issue raised by 
the petitioners: whether section 110(a)(2)(D) even allowed EPA to consider the 
costs of pollution control measures in the first place. 
D. EPA’s Statutory Authority To Consider Costs: The Petitioners’ Arguments 
And The Court’s Decision 
Before the Michigan court, the petitioners argued that the NOx SIP Call’s 
definition of “contribute significantly” not only defied common sense, but also 
violated the very terms of section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Clean Air Act.  That 
provision, they claimed, precluded EPA from incorporating the costs of 
pollution control measures into its identification of significant upwind 
emissions.57 Instead, EPA was required to rely primarily on air quality 
modeling data.58 
The Michigan court, however, disagreed.  Writing for the majority, Judge 
Stephen F. Williams, joined by Judge Judith W. Rogers, held that EPA, when 
determining whether an upwind state’s emissions were contributing 
significantly to downwind ozone nonattainment, permissibly considered 
whether any highly cost-effective pollution control measures were available for 
that state’s sources.59  Because, according to the court, the meaning of the 
phrase “contribute significantly” in section 110(a)(2)(D) was ambiguous, it 
required further interpretation by EPA,60 and under the “settled law of this 
circuit,” EPA could consider economic factors, such as the costs of 
implementing pollution control measures, to interpret such an ambiguous 
 
combustion engines–the four categories targeted by EPA; otherwise, Kentucky would not have to 
reduce any emissions under the NOx SIP Call. 
 55. See Final Brief of Petitioning States (“States’ Brief”), at 17-19, Michigan v. EPA, 213 
F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1497) [hereafter States’ Brief]. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 15-16. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 213 F.3d at 674-79. 
 60. Id. at 677-78. 
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statutory phrase unless Congress has expressed its “clear . . . intent to preclude 
[such] consideration.”61  The majority decided that nothing in the text of 
section 110(a)(2)(D), the overall structure of the Clean Air Act, or the Act’s 
legislative history indicated that Congress intended to bar EPA from 
considering the costs that upwind sources might incur to implement pollution 
control measures.62 Although Congress had not expressly authorized EPA’s 
consideration of control costs under section 110(a)(2)(D), it had not expressly 
precluded such consideration either.  EPA, therefore, could exercise its 
discretion under the statute.63 
In dissent, Judge David B. Sentelle concluded that EPA did not have 
discretion, under section 110(a)(2)(D), to consider the costs of pollution 
control measures.64  He described EPA as a “creature of statute” with authority 
to consider costs only if Congress expressly provides that authority.65 If 
 
 61. Id. (citing NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); George E. Warren 
Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 
F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 62. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679 (summarizing conclusion regarding text, structure and history 
of the Clean Air Act). 
 63. 213 F.3d at 679. The court also rejected a related claim about EPA’s findings of 
significant contributions, namely, that EPA had exercised such unconstrained discretion in 
determining which upwind emissions contributed significantly to downwind ozone nonattainment 
that EPA had violated the nondelegation doctrine.  See id. at 680-81.  For this argument the 
petitioners relied on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Trucking, in which the court held 
that, pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine, an agency must identify a “determinate criterion,” 
derived from the governing statute, to restrain the agency’s exercise of discretion.  175 F.3d at 
1034.  See generally Patricia Ross McCubbin, The D.C. Circuit Gives New Life and New 
Meaning to the Nondelegation Doctrine in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 19 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 57 (2000).  In the challenges to the NOx SIP Call, the Michigan court held that EPA’s 
benchmark of $2,000 for highly cost-effective pollution controls was not based on “anything in 
the language or function of section 110(a)(2)(D)” of the Clean Air Act, and was “essentially 
unbounded,” suggesting a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 43-46; 213 F.3d at 680.  However, the Michigan court held that the nondelegation doctrine 
only applies to agency actions that affect “all American enterprise,” and that, because the NOx 
SIP Call applied to merely twenty-three states–just roughly “half of the nation”–the rule did not 
have to satisfy the doctrine.  Id. at 680-81.  This conclusion–difficult to justify–is now irrelevant 
because the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Trucking, holding 
that the nondelegation doctrine does not serve as a constraint on agency discretion. 121 S. Ct. at 
912-14. 
 64. 213 F.3d at 695.  Judge Sentelle believed that EPA had authority to consider only air 
quality-related information when identifying significant upwind emissions.  Id. 
 65. Id.  For this notion, Judge Sentelle relied on the Supreme Court’s statement that “it is 
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited 
to the authority delegated by Congress.”  Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 
(1988). 
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Congress remains silent, then an agency cannot, as the majority and EPA 
suggested, infer that authority in its decisionmaking.66 
E. Analysis Of The Court’s Decision 
One argument suggests support for Judge Sentelle’s position.  In other 
sections of the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly directs EPA to consider 
costs.  In section 111(a)(1), for example, Congress expressly directs EPA to set 
“new source performance standards” based, in part, on “the cost of achieving 
[an emissions] reduction.”67  One could reasonably conclude that had it 
intended EPA to consider pollution control costs under section 110(a)(2)(D), 
Congress would have similarly directed EPA to do so.68 
Such a literal reading of the Clean Air Act, however, might fail to give 
sufficient weight to the legislative history of the interstate pollution provisions 
in the statute.69 Congress intended those provisions not only to improve overall 
 
 66. 213 F.3d at 695.  Judge Sentelle’s dissent did not address the several prior D.C. Circuit 
cases upon which the majority relied for the notion that EPA may consider costs unless Congress 
clearly bars their consideration.  See id. at 678 (citing NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (en banc); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Grand Canyon 
Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991)). And the majority opinion did not address the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases 
upon which Judge Sentelle relied for the opposite notion.  Id. at 696-97 (citing Bowen, 488 U.S. 
at 208; American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 
F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 68. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
  This argument is buttressed by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in American 
Trucking.  There the Court noted the many different provisions of the Clean Air Act, including 
section 111, under which Congress expressly has directed EPA to consider costs, and explained 
that it will not “find implicit in ambiguous sections of the [Clean Air Act] an authorization to 
consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted.”  121 S. Ct. at 909 
(citations omitted). It held that section 109(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994), does not 
grant EPA express authority to consider costs when setting national ambient air quality standards.  
121 S. Ct. at 911.  Interestingly, the Court distinguished section 110 and the Michigan decision 
(along with a few other D.C. Circuit decisions), indicating that section 110 does not “share[] § 
109(b)(1)’s prominence in the overall statutory scheme.”  121 S. Ct. at 910 n.1.  In other words, 
even though Congress did not expressly grant EPA authority to consider costs in section 110, the 
Court apparently was not troubled by the Michigan court’s decision to allow EPA to do so 
because section 110 is not a “prominent” part of the Clean Air Act. 
 69. Along with section 110(a)(2)(D), other provisions of the Clean Air Act also address 
interstate pollution.  Under section 176A, for instance, EPA may designate “transport regions”–
areas of the country that are affected by a common interstate air pollution problem–and may 
establish a “transport commission” comprised of state representatives to recommend control 
measures for the transport region.  42 U.S.C. § 7506a (1994).  In section 184, Congress 
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air quality but also to alleviate economic disparities between upwind and 
downwind states.70 The legislature recognized that, historically, downwind 
states had imposed more stringent pollution control requirements on their 
emissions sources than had their upwind neighbors, thus imposing “a distinct 
economic and competitive disadvantage” for those sources.71 Congress 
intended “to equalize the positions of the States with respect to interstate 
pollution by making a source at least as responsible for polluting another State 
as it would be for polluting its own State.”72  The NOx SIP Call, therefore, 
satisfied Congress’s intent by requiring upwind states to reduce their emissions 
to levels already obtained by sources using highly cost-effective control 
measures in downwind states. 
An examination of the provision authorizing EPA to call SIPs for 
violations of section 110(a)(2)(D) also supports the Michigan decision.  Under 
section 110(k)(5), EPA can require a state to “mitigate adequately” its 
 
established one particular transport region: the Northeast Ozone Transport Region for twelve 
northeastern states and the District of Columbia.  Id. § 7511c(a) (1994).  See also infra text of 
note 87. 
  In addition, section 126 allows downwind states to petition EPA to impose limits directly 
on upwind stationary sources that violate section 110(a)(2)(D).  42 U.S.C. § 7426(b)-(c) (1994).  
While it was developing the NOx SIP Call, EPA received petitions under section 126 from several 
northeastern states, requesting that EPA find that certain types of NOx-emitting sources in 
specified upwind states were contributing significantly to nonattainment of the one-hour ozone air 
quality standard in the downwind, petitioning states.  Findings of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 
Fed. Reg. 24,058, 24059 (Apr. 30, 1998).  EPA determined that sources of NOx located in twelve 
states (Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia contribute 
significantly to nonattainment of the one-hour ozone standard in the downwind states of 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, and by a later rule, EPA imposed 
federal NOx reduction requirements on those sources (the “Section 126 Rule”).  See Findings of 
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing 
Interstate Ozone Transport, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250 (May 25, 1999); Findings of Significant 
Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone 
Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2674 (Jan. 18, 2000).  Challenges to the Section 126 Rule are currently 
pending before the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA (No. 99-1200). 
 70. See S. Rep. No. 95-127 at 41 (1977), available at LEXIS, Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977 Legislative History, at 25 [hereinafter CAA77 Leg. Hist.] (Strong interstate pollution 
provisions were needed to address the “serious inequities among several States, where one State 
may have more stringent implement plan requirements than another State.”). 
 71. CAA Leg. Hist., supra note 70, at 25 (giving example of Ohio’s failure to adopt any 
control measures for sulfur dioxide until 1976, resulting in increased sulfur dioxide emissions 
transported to its downwind neighbor, West Virginia, which then had to impose “more stringent 
control[s]”). 
 72. Id. at 42. 
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contributions to “interstate pollutant transport,”73 and when determining which 
state mitigation measures would be “adequate,” EPA can consider the costs 
that a state would incur to reduce its emissions.74 Although the petitioners 
maintained that EPA could not consider pollution control costs under section 
110(a)(2)(D) when it identified which upwind emissions were significant, the 
petitioners (and the court) agreed that EPA could have considered those costs 
under section 110(k)(5) when it fashioned the remedy for violation of section 
110(a)(2)(D) and determined the emissions reductions required of the states.  
Perhaps if EPA had kept the two inquiries for its NOx SIP Call analytically 
distinct–first, under section 110(a)(2)(D), using air quality data to identify 
which NOx emissions were contributing significantly to downwind ozone 
nonattainment, and second, under section 110(k)(5), considering whether 
highly cost-effective control measures were available to reduce those 
emissions–the end result would have been a less controversial application of 
the Clean Air Act.  The end result for the upwind states, however, would have 
been the same: a requirement to reduce NOx emissions to a level reflecting the 
use of highly cost-effective control measures. 
IV.  COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE NOX EMISSIONS BUDGETS 
A. Implementing The Clean Air Act: The Roles Of States And EPA 
The Clean Air Act establishes a scheme of “cooperative federalism” with 
distinct roles for EPA and the states.75 To regulate ozone pollution, for 
example, EPA sets air quality standards prescribing permissible levels of the 
pollutant, while each state, by adopting a State Implementation Plan, has the 
authority to choose which sources to regulate and which pollution control 
measures to adopt in order to meet those levels.76 One state might require 
 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1994).  That provision does not expressly refer to section 
110(a)(2)(D).  Instead, it refers to “interstate pollutant transport described in section [176A] of 
this title or section [184] of this title.”  Sections 176A and 184, in turn, establish “transport 
commissions” that may make recommendations to EPA to bring states into compliance with the 
prohibition on contributions to interstate pollution established by section 110(a)(2)(D).  See 42 
U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(2) (1994) (interstate transport commission shall recommend to EPA “such 
measures as the Commission determines to be necessary to ensure that the plans for the relevant 
States meet the requirements of section 7410(a)(2)(D) of this title”); id. § 7511c(c)(5) (1994) 
(EPA may make a finding in response to a recommendation from the Northeast Ozone Transport 
Commission that a state’s SIP “is inadequate to meet the requirements of section 7410(a)(2)(D) of 
this title”).  See also infra text accompanying notes 87-88. 
 74. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,376; 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,325.  See also 213 F.3d at 676-77 (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1994) and explaining petitioners’ concession that control costs could be 
considered under that provision). 
 75. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 76. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).  See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The federal government through the EPA 
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emissions reductions from large industries or power plants, while another 
might require reductions from a broad array of smaller sources that might 
include dry cleaners, gas stations, or automobiles.  Although it must review 
each state’s SIP, EPA has no authority to question the state’s choices as long as 
the SIP meets the requirements of the Clean Air Act.77 This careful balance 
between federal and state authority is a key element of the statute,78 and the 
eight states challenging the NOx SIP Call argued that EPA upset this balance 
and violated the states’ rights when it assigned specific “emissions budgets” 
for each state to meet.79 
B. EPA’s NOx Emissions Budgets 
To determine the exact NOx emissions reductions required of each state by 
the NOx SIP Call, EPA took an unprecedented step, assigning a mandatory 
NOx emissions budget to each of the twenty-three upwind states that were, 
according to EPA, contributing significantly to downwind ozone 
nonattainment.80 Relying on its earlier assessment of pollution control costs, 
EPA determined a state’s emissions budget by calculating what the state’s total 
NOx emissions output would be if the state implemented the highly cost-
effective pollution control measures available for the four types of sources that 
EPA previously had identified.81 To determine the NOx emissions budget for 
Ohio, for example, EPA calculated that if Ohio were to require all of its large 
power plants, large industrial boilers, cement kilns and stationary internal 
 
determines the ends–the standards of air quality–but Congress has given the states the initiative 
and broad responsibility regarding the means to achieve those ends through state implementation 
plans and timetables for compliance.”) (citations omitted). 
 77. Train, 421 U.S. at 79.  See also Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976) 
(The Clean Air Act “place[s] the primary responsibility for formulating pollution control 
strategies on the States, but nonetheless subject[s] the States to strict minimum compliance 
requirements.”). 
 78. See Mark Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under The Surface Mining Control And 
Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way To Run A Government?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10039, 10039 
(cooperation federalism is a hallmark of the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes); 
Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered Federalism: Can 
Cooperative Federalism Models From Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3 HASTINGS W.-
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 199 (Winter 1996) (describing the “state primacy” or “dual 
regulation” model of cooperative federalism found in various federal pollution control statutes). 
 79. See States’ Brief, supra note 55, at 34-40. 
 80. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377-78. 
 81. Id. at 57,403 (“The above discussion described the controls for various source categories 
that EPA considers to be highly cost-effective.  The next step in the process is to determine the 
amounts of NOx emissions that would be eliminated by applying these highly cost-effective 
controls to the respective source categories. The EPA considers those emissions to be the 
amounts that contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, 
downwind States.  By assuming that reductions of this magnitude should occur, EPA determined 
the resulting State-specific ‘budget.’”). 
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combustion engines to implement the highly cost-effective pollution control 
measures identified by EPA, then Ohio’s overall NOx emissions would be 
reduced from 372,626 tons per year to 239,898 tons per year.82  Consequently, 
EPA set the NOx emissions budget for Ohio at 239,898 tons per year, requiring 
Ohio to submit a SIP demonstrating that the state would meet that cap.83 
It is important to understand that EPA did not dictate that the states 
actually impose the highly cost-effective control measures on the four 
pollution sources it had identified, but simply set mandatory, state-wide 
emissions caps based on its calculations.  Ohio, for example, in order to reduce 
its NOx emissions to 239,898 tons per year, was not required to adopt the 
specific pollution controls for the four sources identified by EPA, but was free 
to obtain the necessary emissions reductions through whatever mix of control 
measures on whatever sources it chose.84  The states challenging the NOx SIP 
Call, however, argued that although EPA had not explicitly dictated which 
control measures each state should implement, the assumptions made by EPA 
when calculating the emissions budgets effectively dictated the states’ 
choices.85  For this argument, the petitioners relied on an earlier decision of the 
D.C. Circuit in Virginia v. EPA.86 
C. Petitioners’ Reliance On The Virginia Decision And The NOTC LEV Rule 
Established by Congress in 1990, and composed of representatives from 
thirteen northeastern states, the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission, or 
 
 82. Id. at 57,439 (showing total budget for Ohio of 239,898 as well as total budgets for the 
twenty-two other covered states ); id. at 57,433-36, Table III-5 & Table III-7 (showing calculated 
emissions levels in each state if EGUs (i.e., large power plants) and non-EGUs (i.e., industrial 
boilers, cement kilns and stationary internal combustion engines) reduced their emissions to 
EPA’s assumed control levels). 
  EPA revised the states’ emissions budgets (twice) after receiving comments about some 
of the technical data EPA had gathered in the “emissions inventories” from which it calculated 
the budgets.  See Technical Amendment to the Finding of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking for Certain States for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 26,298 (May 14, 1999); Technical Amendment to the Finding of Significant Contribution 
and Rulemaking for Certain States for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 65 
Fed. Reg. 11,222 (Mar. 2, 2000).  The emissions inventories describe all the various sources of 
emissions in a state.  Based on EPA’s changes to the emissions inventories, Ohio’s revised budget 
was set at 249,274 tons of NOx.  See 65 Fed. Reg. at 11,225.  Challenges to EPA’s budget 
revisions are currently pending before the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA (No. 
99-1268). 
 83. Id. at 57,491-92 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.121(a)(1) & (e)(2)). 
 84. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,378 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,328). 
 85. States’ Brief, supra note 55, at 34-40. 
 86. Id.  See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1407 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 
116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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NOTC, serves as an advisory commission to EPA.87 In 1994, a majority of the 
NOTC members voted to recommend that EPA require the thirteen NOTC 
states to enact a “Low Emission Vehicle” (LEV) program to help reduce intra- 
and interstate ozone pollution.88 Adopting the NOTC’s recommendation, EPA 
issued the “NOTC LEV Rule,” which mandated that the NOTC states reduce 
NOx and VOC emissions either by implementing the LEV program or by 
implementing alternative controls.89 However, EPA’s NOTC LEV Rule 
required a state implementing alternative controls to achieve NOx and VOC 
reductions several times greater than the reductions expected if it implemented 
the LEV program.90 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, one of the NOTC states that had voted 
against the recommendation, challenged the NOTC LEV Rule, claiming that 
although it ostensibly allowed states the ability to choose alternatives, the rule 
effectively mandated only one control measure, the LEV program.91 The D.C. 
Circuit agreed, concluding that, because “only a very foolish state” would 
choose to implement alternative controls that would require much greater 
emissions reductions, EPA had not given the states any real alternatives to the 
LEV program.92  Consequently, the court invalidated the NOTC LEV Rule.93 
Because the NOTC LEV Rule represented EPA’s only other effort to 
implement the good neighbor provision of section 110(a)(2)(D),94 the states 
 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a) (1994).  Those thirteen jurisdictions make up the Northeast Ozone 
Transport Region (NOTR).  Id.  While Congress did not specifically include all of Virginia within 
the NOTR, Virginia participates because the northern portion of that state lies within the 
“Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area” that includes the District of Columbia.  See 
Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1401 n.2. 
 88. See Ozone Transport Commission; Recommendation that EPA Adopt Low Emission 
Vehicle Program for the Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,914 (March 18, 
1994).  LEVs emit very few NOx and VOC emissions.  Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1401-02.  As the 
Virginia case explained, the NOTC LEV program was modeled on the very stringent NOx and 
VOC emissions limits of California’s LEV program.  Id. at 1401. 
 89. Final Rule on Ozone Transport Commission; Low Emission Vehicle Program for the 
Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 60 Fed. Reg. 4712, 4712-13 (Jan. 24, 1995). 
 90. Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1404-05 (explaining that if Virginia chose not to adopt the LEV 
program and use alternative measures, it would  have to reduce NOx emissions 3.5 times, and 
VOC emissions 6.5 times, more than under the LEV program). 
 91. Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1398, 1404-05.  See also id. at 1403-10 (analyzing whether EPA 
exceeded its authority under section 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410). 
 92. Id. at 1404-05. 
 93. Id. at 1406-10 (applying Train, 421 U.S. at 60). 
 94. The NOTC LEV Rule, while issued pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D), was formally 
initiated by the states’ recommendation and was not initiated by EPA itself, as was the NOx SIP 
Call.  See 60 Fed. Reg. at 4716 (“EPA is approving the OTC’s LEV recommendation based on the 
determination under sections 184(c) and [section] 110(a)(2)(D) of the Act that the recommended 
LEV program is necessary throughout the OTR to bring certain OTR nonattainment areas into 
attainment. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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challenging the NOx SIP Call in Michigan, mimicking the language in the 
Virginia opinion, argued that “only a very foolish state” would choose to 
implement pollution control measures other than those used by EPA to 
calculate the state’s emissions budget.95 No state, they claimed, would seek 
emissions reductions from any sources except those four types for which EPA 
had identified highly cost-effective control measures, since choosing 
alternative pollution control measures, by definition, would be more costly.96 
D. Analysis Of The Court’s Decision 
The Michigan court rejected the petitioners’ argument, holding that the 
NOx SIP Call did not expressly require, or even effectively mandate, that the 
states implement the highly cost-effective control measures for the four 
sources identified by EPA.97  Distinguishing Virginia, the court explained that 
while the earlier decision prohibited EPA’s adoption of a rule that left states 
with only “unreasonable or impracticable” alternatives, it did not prohibit a 
rule that gave states reasonable yet more costly alternatives.98  The court found 
that, under the NOx SIP Call, states not choosing to implement the highly cost-
effective control measures identified by EPA still had reasonably cost-
effective alternative controls available, including, for example, programs to 
reduce NOx emissions from automobiles.99 Moreover, states choosing 
alternative controls would not be penalized with additional emissions reduction 
requirements like those imposed by the NOTC LEV Rule.100 Instead, the 
emissions budgets under the NOx SIP Call set one—and only one—emissions 
reduction requirement for the state.101 Because “real choice exists for the 
 
 95. States’ Brief, supra note 55, at 39. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 213 F.3d at 685-88. 
 98. Id. at 688 (emphasis in original). 
 99. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,438 (e.g., vehicle inspection and maintenance programs and 
reformulated gasoline program); 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,328 (“[O]ne State may choose to primarily 
achieve emissions reductions from stationary sources while another State may focus on emissions 
reductions from the mobile source sector.”) (cited in Michigan, 213 F.3d at 688) (emphasis 
added).  In addition, EPA had made no final determination about control costs for sources for 
which it lacked sufficient information, but it anticipated that states with adequate information 
could implement reasonably cost-effective control schemes.  63 Fed. Reg. at 57,416-17. 
 100. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,369-70 (explaining that, unlike the Virginia case, states subject to the 
NOx SIP Call “will have significant discretion to choose the appropriate mix of controls to meet 
the emissions budget”).  See also supra text accompanying notes 89-90 (explaining the additional 
emissions requirements imposed by the NOTC LEV Rule if a state did not adopt the LEV 
program). 
 101. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,492 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.121(e)(1)) (setting one 
emissions budget for each of the twenty-three states). 
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covered states,” the Michigan court concluded that EPA had not contravened 
the cooperative federalism of the Clean Air Act.102 
The Michigan court’s conclusion is supported by a more detailed 
examination of EPA’s method for calculating the NOx emissions budgets.  
Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, EPA had not identified the four sources 
used in its budgets calculations as the only sources for which highly cost-
effective pollution control measures were available.  Because it had averaged 
the costs of control measures for all twenty-three upwind states, EPA 
recognized that an individual state might find certain control measures costing 
less than this average.103 For example, there are relatively few lime kilns 
throughout all twenty-three states, and, on average, it would not be cost-
effective for most states to develop and implement regulations addressing so 
few sources.104  However, for any state with several lime kilns, regulating them 
could very well be a highly cost-effective option.105  Thus, contrary to the 
petitioners’ claim, choosing alternative control measures to meet the emissions 
budgets of the NOx SIP Call would not be, by definition, more costly. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Regulating interstate ozone pollution is a complicated task, requiring 
sophisticated technical analyses to determine the degree to which one state’s 
NOx emissions affect ozone levels in other states.  For the NOx SIP Call, EPA 
not only reviewed complex scientific data, but also developed a regulatory 
mechanism that reflected the costs of pollution control measures that states 
could reasonably adopt. 
Although unprecedented and controversial, this approach was nevertheless 
consistent, according to the Michigan court, with the good neighbor provision 
of the Clean Air Act.  The resulting emissions budgets, while appearing to 
restrict the states’ choices, in fact, allowed each state sufficient flexibility to 
implement a variety of pollution control measures, thereby preserving the 
careful balance of authority mandated by the cooperative federalism of the 
Clean Air Act. 
 
 
 102. 213 F.3d at 688. 
 103. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,399-400, 57,438. 
 104. Id. at 57,416.  EPA also believed that cost-effective controls might be available for 
several other types of sources, including medical waste incinerators, fiberglass manufacturers, 
and fluid catalytic cracking units at petroleum refineries, but recognized that the numbers of these 
sources were relatively small.  Id. 
 105. Id. (acknowledging that “NOx controls may be available at costs less than $2,000 per ton 
for lime kilns”).  See also id. at 57,438 (“In individual States, emissions from such sources [in 
categories with few numbers] could be a high percentage of uncontrolled emissions, and, thus, be 
subject to efficient, cost-effective controls for that particular State.”). 
